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Abstract—In the development of complex critical systems, an
important source of errors is the misinterpretation of system
requirements allocated to the software, due to inadequate com-
munication between system engineering teams and software
teams. In response, organizations that develop such systems
are searching for solutions allowing formal system engineering
and system to software bridging, based on standard languages
like SysML. As part of this effort, we have defined a formal
profile for SysML (OMEGA SysML) and we have built a
simulation and verification toolbox for this profile (IFx). This
paper reports on the experience of modelling and validating an
industry-grade system, the Solar Generation System (SGS) of
the Automated Transfer Vehicle (ATV) built by Astrium, using
IFx-OMEGA. The experience reveals what can currently be
expected from such an approach and what are the weak points
that should be addressed by future research and development.
Keywords-system engineering, modelling, SysML, simulation,
model-checking, temporal properties, abstraction
I. INTRODUCTION
One of the major risks of errors in the development of
real time critical embedded software is the misinterpretation
of the system requirements allocated to the software. These
misunderstandings between the system team and the soft-
ware team may have several sources, but are very often due
to the following causes:
• Use of ambiguous means to describe the system re-
quirements and the software implementation, leading
to different interpretations by the system designers, the
software developers and the reviewers.
• Insufficient knowledge by the software team of the
formalisms and jargon used by the system team, leading
to the development of software that does not satisfy the
system requirements.
• Insufficient knowledge by the system team of the for-
malisms and jargon used by the software team, leading
to inefficient reviews of the software specification and
code by the system team.
The errors potentially introduced during the development
are then generally discovered very late by very costly test
processes.
This situation is a cause of particular concern in the
aerospace domain, where multiple suppliers have to build
integrated systems based on common system requirements.
It has lead the main actors of the field (agencies and main
contractors) to search for solutions allowing formal system
engineering and system to software bridging. One such
effort was the ASSERT project1 led by the European Space
Agency (ESA), with the objective of defining a complete
system/software engineering process for complex and crit-
ical space systems. The ASSERT development process is
now supported by a set of tools called TASTE [9]. The
main scope of the ASSERT project was the management of
non functional requirements, from the capture of system re-
quirements to the automatic generation of code. The present
work is part of a follow-up project, Full MDE2 [8], which
aims to complement the ASSERT process on the functional
aspects, allowing full functional system modelling based on
an adapted use of the SysML standard [21].
SysML is a graphical modelling language well adapted for
system engineering and it is increasingly used in industry in
the development of real-time embedded systems. For exam-
ple, Astrium Space Transportation has deployed SysML for
capturing the systems requirements of the new version of
the Ariane-5 launcher. But its semantics is underspecified
in order to preserve the generality of the language. The
OMEGA Profile [13], previously defined for UML [23], has
been adapted to SysML in order to suppress any ambigui-
ties and provide a formal operational semantics, rendering
SysML models amenable to formal verification. The UML
version of the OMEGA profile was conceived to be used
in the design and validation of real-time embedded systems,
and it has been used in several industry-grade models (e.g.,
[18], [20]) providing interesting validation results. Like the
UML profile, OMEGA SysML is implemented in the IFx
toolkit3 [19] which provides simulation and timed-automata
based model-checking [7].
In this paper we assess the use of OMEGA SysML and
IFx in the design and validation of the system models of
a space vehicle control subsystem: the Solar Generation
System (SGS), which manages the deployment and posi-
tioning of the solar wings of the Automated Transfer Vehicle
(ATV)4 developed by Astrium Space Transportation for the
1ASSERT was a European FP6 Integrated Project lasting from September
2004 to December 2007. http://www.assert-project.net/
2Full Model Driven Development for On-Board Software, Contract
ESTEC 22618/09/NL/JK
3http://www.irit.fr/ifx
4http://www.esa.int/atv
European Space Agency. The case study, led by Astrium,
covers the entire system engineering phase of SGS; however,
in this paper we concentrate on the aspects that are specific
to OMEGA SysML and in which the IFx toolbox plays
a role. The OMEGA SysML profile was used in reverse
engineering to capture the system architecture, covering
software, hardware and external subsystems interacting with
the SGS, and to give a high-level functional model for each
of these pieces. In terms of SysML, the architecture descrip-
tion takes the form of block diagrams, and the functional
description of the blocks takes the form of detailed state
diagrams, including timing and lower-level action details.
The overall system requirements are also formalized so
that their satisfaction can be determined by simulation and
model-checking with the IFx toolbox.
The case study shows how a formal system engineering
approach helps increasing the confidence in system design
models, which are used as starting point in the subsequent
development steps. The purpose of this paper is to reveal
what can currently be expected from such an approach and
what are the weak points that should be addressed by future
research and tool development.
Paper structure: In Section II we position the IFx-
OMEGA approach in the Full MDE Process, while Sec-
tion III presents an overview of the OMEGA SysML Profile.
Section IV provides a brief description of the architecture
and main functionalities of the SGS case study. Section V
presents the verification model and the properties this model
has to satisfy. The validation methodology and the main
results obtained by simulation and model-checking are de-
scribed in Section VI. In Section VII we position our
approach with respect to other toolsets, before concluding.
II. THE FULL MDE PROCESS
The Full MDE project aimed at filling the gaps between
system modelling and software modelling, and between the
code generated automatically from the software model and
manual code corresponding to functional requirements, by
using a Model Driven Engineering (MDE) approach.
In the Full MDE process, each step of development of em-
bedded software is formalized by safe and non-ambiguous
languages which also provide proof techniques. The Full
MDE approach has selected:
• for system design, the OMEGA SysML Profile which
is also used in the ASSERT process to capture non-
functional requirements;
• for software design, SCADE suite [34] - a graphical
modelling language mixing automata and data flow
views - and
• for implementation code, the SPARK Ada language
[35] designed to support the development of software
systems where the correct operation of software is
essential for the security and safety of the system.
The successive refinement steps between the three model
layers are realized by model transformation techniques.
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Figure 1. FullMDE: An engineering process based on models, formal
methods and model transformation
The purpose of a formal approach is to verify as early
as possible by simulation and proofs the system and to
discover potential errors, an approach that is more reliable
and potentially less costly compared to a more traditional
one relying only on informal paper documents and on tests.
Figure 1 summarizes the Full MDE process.
The system design is an important task for the develop-
ment of critical systems and it guides the entire process. The
architecture of the system and its properties are expressed
in the OMEGA SysML Profile and are subject to formal
validation within the IFx toolbox. Once it is verified, the
model is transformed and integrated into SCADE modeller
which verifies the complementary sets of requirements.
SPARK Ada code is then generated automatically from
SCADE by a certifiable tool. The combination of SPARK
and SCADE allows the verification of correct integration of
manual and generated code, the absence of runtime errors
and the satisfaction of functional properties. A more detailed
description of the process can be found in [8].
III. OVERVIEW OF OMEGA SYSML AND IFX
OMEGA SysML defines the semantics of a rich subset
of SysML elements, providing the necessary constructs for
modelling real-time embedded systems designs. The profile
also defines a very few extensions, in the form of stereo-
types; their use however is not mandatory and a SysML
model can generally be interpreted as an OMEGA SysML
model without syntactic changes.
The architecture of a system is defined in terms of
blocks; OMEGA supports most of the standard features of
SysML blocks, such as properties (attributes and parts), re-
lationships (associations, compositions and generalizations),
interconnection elements (connectors, ports, interfaces) and
mechanisms for defining structured data types and signals.
As usual in SysML, such elements are described in Block
Definition Diagrams (BDDs) and Internal Block Diagrams
(IBDs). Being a formal profile, OMEGA defines a set of
additional well-formedness rules, in particular for strong
static typing. The profile also clarifies the semantics of
elements that are not fully described in the SysML standard,
such as the default behaviour of ports. The well-formedeness
rule set is fully formalized in OCL [24] and is enforced by
the IFx tools, which encourages rigorous system engineer-
ing. Further details on the rules, their rationale and their
formalisation can be found in [17].
The behaviour of system components is expressed in
OMEGA by state machines, possibly involving detailed
action descriptions, which can be structured into operations.
Actions are expressed in concrete textual semantics, compli-
ant with the UML action metamodel, and cover notions like:
variable assignments, signal output, block and connector
creation/destruction, operation calls, expression evaluation,
value return. As the standard action language of the OMG,
ALF [25], is under work, there are plans to use ALF as
action syntax in OMEGA in the future.
OMEGA defines a timed operational semantics, based
on the asynchronous composition of the behaviours of
different blocks. In order to allow the user to control the
concurrency granularity, which can have an important impact
on the effectiveness of the verification tools, the semantics
partitions the set of blocks into activity groups, based on the
concurrency meta-attribute (a standard feature of SysML).
Thus each block can be defined as active or passive, and each
active block defines an activity group consisting of itself and
its dependent passive blocks. Activity groups are executed
concurrently and they react to external stimuli (signals) in
atomic run-to-completion steps. Details on the execution and
communication model can be found in [16].
The model time base can be either discrete or dense and it
is specified by the user when simulation or model-checking
is performed. Model time is controlled using the primitives
of timed automata with urgency [5]: clocks, timed guards
and transition urgency annotations, which are stereotypes
used to control how logical time can progress depending
on the transitions that are fireable in a certain state. Time
progress can thus be disabled (when at least one urgent
transition is fireable), enabled but bounded (when there
is no urgent transition but there is at least one delayable
transition), or enabled and unbounded.
One of the few syntactic extensions defined in the profile
concerns observers, which are used to formalize the system
requirements that correspond to timed safety properties.
An observer is a special type of block (stereotyped with
≪observer≫) that can monitor the system states and
events and give verdicts about the (non-)satisfaction of a
requirement. Its behaviour is defined by a state machine,
with some states qualified as ≪error≫, respectively
≪success≫, states expressing the (non-)satisfaction of
a safety requirement.
The SysML Profile is implemented by the IFx-OMEGA
toolbox, which provides static checking, compiling, simula-
tion and model-checking tools. The tools rely on the trans-
lation of the relevant parts of a model to the input language
of the IFx Toolset5 [6], which is based on asynchronous
communicating timed automata.
IV. THE ATV SOLAR GENERATION WING
MANAGEMENT SYSTEM
The ATV, developed by Astrium Space Transportation for
the European Space Agency, is a space cargo ship launched
into orbit by the European heavy launcher Ariane-5 with
the aim of resupplying the International Space Station. The
case study presented here - the Solar Generation Subsystem
(SGS) - manages the solar arrays which provide the vehicle,
for up to 6 months, the energy needed to fulfil its mission.
SGS is responsible with providing functional chains to re-
alise the solar arrays deployment and controlling the rotation
of the solar wings of the ATV.
The SGS consists of a set of hardware and software
entities; its software part is a subsystem of the Flight
Application Software. The hardware of this subsystem has
more than 70 devices, with multiple levels of redundancy
for achieving reliability and availability in case of failures.
Its main elements are the four wings, each of them being
powered by two motors; a set of four motors (one from
each wing) is controlled by a solar array driving electronics
(SADE). Each wing has four hold-down and release systems
(HDRS) which maintain the wing in its initial stowed
position during the Ariane-5 flight. To deploy a wing, each
HDRS has to be cut by a thermal knife; there are two knives
for each HDRS, a nominal one and a redundant one. All
these hardware pieces are enabled at the right time by four
power units and four thermal control units. The activation
of each piece of hardware is given by two command and
monitoring units which also supervise the entire system.
Each thermal control unit has 2 regulators - solar arrays
driving group (SADG) -, which control 4 thermal knives
each. Each regulator cannot power more than one thermal
knife at a time.
The system has two operating modes:
1) The solar wing deployment mode. During take-off the
four wings of the ATV are stowed. Their deployment
starts by removing the safety barriers from the ther-
mal control units (TCU). Safety barriers prevent the
unwanted release of a wing by forbidding the enabling
of the thermal knives by the TCUs. Then the restraint
cables are cut by at least 4 of the 8 thermal knives of
the wing. In order for the HDRS to be cut, each knife
has to be active for 50 seconds. The deployment of
the panels starts immediately after the last hold-down
system has been cut. The deployment motion is driven
by deployment strings at the root hinge and the panel
hinges. After the deployment is completed, the panel
hinges and root hinge lock positively to provide a
stiff, backlash free, deployed configuration and safety
barriers are restored.
5http://www-if.imag.fr/
2) The solar wing rotation mode. It is realized by two
motors that control the position of the wing and
connect it with the avionics equipment chain. The
position of the wing is measured by reed switches
and magnets fixed on the wing’s motors. The solar
array driving electronics that control the wings are
working in cold redundancy: at a given time only one
can be on and control the orientation of the 4 wings.
The measures captured by the sensors are sent via the
active SADE device to a central processing unit which
numerically computes the direction in which the wings
should be rotating and their speed, results sent back to
SADE to be executed. The rotating mode is infinite,
by cyclic activation of one SADE device.
V. THE SYSTEM MODEL
In the scope of the Full MDE R&T project, the SysML
model has been built in reverse engineering by the Astrium
engineering team using IBM Rhapsody6. In this section
we describe the architecture of the model, the structural
issues that have been detected by applying the OMEGA
well-formedness rules and the changes they induced in the
model, and the formalization of the dynamic property that
was verified.
A. The original system model
The SysML model captures both the architecture of the
system and its timed behaviour. There are three types of
blocks:
• 9 hardware block types describe the equipment of the
ATV. Their behaviour is generally split in two operating
modes: a healthy mode which models the nominal
behaviour and a failure mode.
• 3 software block types, each with a specific function
(e.g. deployment, rotation, etc). Each block reacts to
stimuli coming from the environment (external mission
management) and controls the behaviour of the hard-
ware devices by executing automated procedures.
• A block that “simulates” the mission management.
It initiates the two functionalities of the ATV solar
generation system (deployment and rotation of wings)
respecting the timing constraints imposed by each of
these modes. In order to validate the software, the
mission management models a finite behaviour - the
wing deployment and three wings rotations.
Some blocks are further decomposed in sub-blocks, the
maximum depth consisting of 4 layers. The model defines a
total of 20 block types (7 of which are refined by means of
24 Internal Block Diagrams), 204 ports and 234 connectors.
The entire system contains 95 block instances: 12 composite
ones refined into 78 hardware devices, 3 software instances,
one instance of the mission management and the one repre-
senting the entire system; with a total of 517 port instances
and 366 connectors.
6http://www-01.ibm.com/software/awdtools/rhapsody/
B. Static coherence and compliance with OMEGA
The first benefit of applying the Full MDE process to
this SysML model comes from the application of the static
well-formedness rules of the OMEGA profile, which allows
detecting a range of inconsistencies, in particular related
to typing. Indeed, standard SysML modelling tools like
Rhapsody do not impose strong static typing rules, and
accept for example the definition of untyped ports. Since
ports are not typed, connectors can also be defined between
potentially incompatible ports. Such errors can go unnoticed
throughout the system engineering phase, and last sometimes
until the integration test campaign, when correcting them
becomes very costly.
The initial SGS model did not contain any interface
definition, and all the 204 ports were untyped. The errors
provided by the OMEGA compiler have led to the definition
of 18 interfaces which were used to specify port contracts.
This allowed us also to detect connection errors in the
model, such as duplicated connectors. We found that around
20% of the ports defined throughout the model were not
respecting the uniqueness and completeness rules, which
means that the destination of an incoming signal was either
undefined or ambiguous. This led to another reiteration on
the system model either correcting the contract for these
ports or splitting their functionality with respect to the target
object.
As a counterpart, several syntactic changes were required
for static compliance to the OMEGA profile. For example,
OMEGA requires unique names within a block or state
machine: an attribute and signal reception having the same
name or two sub-states within two parallel states of the same
statechart with the same identifier are forbidden. The syntax
for certain constructs (timers, enumeration literals, access to
arrays, etc.) is different from the one used in Rhapsody/C++.
However, the effort required for these syntactic changes is
minor relative to the size of the project: between 1 and 2
person*days for the SGS model.
C. Preparing the model for formal verification
Once the model is statically coherent and compliant with
OMEGA, some effort is still necessary to prepare it for
formal verification, in particular for formally defining the
properties to be verified. The main objective, for SGS, was
to verify that the system is 1-fault tolerant: the mission
succeeds even if one component of the system has failed
during execution.
Injecting failures into the system model. The failure
mode was already modelled for each of the 62 hardware
devices of the SGS: thermal knives, hold-down and release
systems, thermal control units, solar arrays driving groups,
power units and command and monitoring units. However,
in order to ease the definition of verification configurations,
we decided to add a block that commands the failure of one
equipment, chosen based on a parameter that can be con-
figured before each verification session without recompiling
the whole model. We have added another 144 ports and 138
connectors for inducing errors. The target device fails non-
deterministically, at an arbitrary moment during the system
execution.
Formalizing system properties. Requirements are captured
by OMEGA observers, then verified against the model under
the 1-fault hypothesis.
The requirement we describe here is defined with respect
to temporal properties of the system and is concerned with
the behaviour of the system in case of failure: no matter
what error for equipment devices is injected in the system,
the deployment of the wings shall succeed. This implies
that the redundant devices replace nominal ones in case of
failure.
Property 1: After 10 minutes since SGS start-up, all four
wings are deployed and the mission management is aware
of it.
The observer in Figure 2 models this property. In the
initial state the system is off. Because we need to observe
specific objects from the system and these objects exist only
after the initialization of the entire system, the observer
waits until the initialized signal is emitted by the ATV.
Then it triggers the transition and arms a clock with the
value deployment duration, in this case 10 minutes. If
after this deadline the four wings have not been deployed,
the observer enters the state NOT DEPLOYED and the
property is violated. If the wings have been deployed, the
observer enters the state DEPLOYED in which it verifies
if the mission management is aware of it. After the entire
deployment process, the software piece concerned by this
task verifies the locked status of the wings, via an inter-
mediary control and monitoring unit (CMU), and forwards
the global confirmation to mission management (MVM).
The MVM resumes its behaviour and continues its mission
until the END state is reached. Then the observer enters the
success state MISSION EVENT and the expressed property
is satisfied. If it is not the case in the time passed from start-
up then an error has occurred and the property is violated.
VI. SYSTEM VALIDATION
A. Validation methodology
In IFx-OMEGA, the validation of models consists in per-
forming several steps, supported by different tools, according
to the following workflow:
1) The first step is the translation phase from the
OMEGA model to an IF model by a sysml2if com-
piler, which enforces the well-formedness rules de-
fined by the profile and allows detecting some static
errors, as already discussed in Section V-B.
2) One can proceed with an interactive random simula-
tion phase, which allows us to quickly detect certain
problems, such as deadlocks that occur systematically.
3) The correct modelling of the system can be verified
via the absence of deadlocks. It is an extension of
the simulation phase in which we can pre-check the
SYSTEM_IS_OFF
Reactions
deployment_duration = 600000
SYSTEM_IS_ON
/match informal "initialized" by ATV //
clock.set(deployment_duration)
NOT_DEPLOYED
«error»[clock>=0]/clock.reset()
MISSION_EVENT
«success» DEPLOYED
[(ATV.SGS.WING1.LOCKING @ DEPLOYED ) and 
( ATV.SGS.WING2.LOCKING @ DEPLOYED ) and 
( ATV.SGS.WING3.LOCKING @ DEPLOYED ) and 
( ATV.SGS.WING4.LOCKING @ DEPLOYED )]
[ATV.MVM @ END]/
clock.reset()
NO_MISSION_EVENT
«error»[clock>=0]/clock.reset()
Figure 2. Observer modelling that the four wings are deployed 10 minutes
after start-up and the mission management is aware
system model by searching for certain state space
configurations.
4) The main validation step is the model-checking phase
which, in IFx-OMEGA, consists in the exhaustive ex-
ploration of the product state space of the relevant part
of the model and a set of observers while searching
for the absence of error states and stopping at success
state. If the model-checking algorithm finds errors then
it produces scenarios which can be replayed in the
simulator, in order to diagnose the cause.
The verification is usually not a one-shot phase, differ-
ent strategies for reducing the combinatorial explosion
of the state space being often applied in an iterative
fashion. In IFx-OMEGA, some reduction of the state
space can be obtained automatically, for example by
applying conservative model transformations based on
static analysis techniques (dead code/variable elimi-
nation, variable abstractions) or by applying partial
order reduction [12]. However, it is often necessary
to involve the user for manually defining abstractions,
as we will show in the case of SGS.
B. Validation by simulation
Despite the fact that the SysML model had been thor-
oughly reviewed, the interactive simulation of nominal sce-
narios and the execution of a series of random simulations
allowed several modelling errors to be found.
Most errors discovered in this phase concern unexpected
message receptions. When a block receives a message while
in a particular state when the message is not expected, it will
block and this generally leads to a global deadlock or model
failure. In the SGS model, several such problems have been
found in the behaviour of thermal knives and of wings. Some
unexpected message receptions had to be modelled.
In some cases, like for the SGS mission management
block, the unexpected message receptions were due to the
existence of parallel composite states reacting to the same
message; the designer intended only one parallel state to
react to the message during a certain flight phase, but failed
to specify correctly the conditions that enabled and disabled
the receptions when going from one phase to another. Even if
the model is intended to be a high-level system description,
such behaviours can be quite intricate and errors are difficult
to find without a simulation tool.
We mention that the length of a SGS simulation scenario
is around 2400 steps (a step corresponding to the firing of a
transition), and needs less than a minute to be executed on
a regular desktop computer.
C. Verifying the absence of deadlocks
Even though a large set of deadlocks was detected
and corrected during the simulation phase, in unexplored
states of the system other deadlocks might appear. These
ones concern the hardware devices which can block if
the software parts send inadequate (sequences of) requests.
The absence of deadlocks ensures only that the system is
correctly modelled and does not guarantee that the system
correctly behaves. Finding the modelling errors that result in
deadlocks is an important task since we can detect unrealistic
behaviours of the modelled systems that often go unnoticed
due to incorrect interpretations of the model until software
integration.
It was the case for solar array driving electronics (SADE),
responsible for the wing rotation, which failed due to an
incorrect deactivation sequence: the deactivation command
preceded the disabling command. The two signals were sent
in this order by the software: deactivation via a power unit
and disable directly, without any timing constraints being
imposed. This error was due to an unrealistic approximation
made in the model, namely that the deactivation command is
executed in zero time. In the real software, the deactivation
command has a 200 ms execution time thus leading to a
correct switch-off of the device. The correction consisted in
adding a timer for the deactivation command in the power
unit.
No other deadlocks were found after this verification step,
under the hypothesis of no induced failures.
D. A failed model checking attempt with positive results
The next validation step was to attempt to verify, by
model-checking, the property described in Section V-C.
This requirement had to be verified against the 62 possible
failures of hardware devices. In the current configuration
of the system, the verification of this requirement does not
finish7.
We chose to continue by using a non-exhaustive explo-
ration strategy: the system is executed on only two threads,
one thread for the simulation block which induces failures
7We were using a IA64 computing server with 16GB of memory. The
state space generation had to be stopped after 3 hours as the memory was
exhausted.
and the second thread for all the other SGS blocks. This
execution is partial in the sense that signals sent to different
blocks are always handled in the order in which they were
sent and different action interleavings are not taken into
consideration. But, as long as errors are detected, it is an
acceptable search strategy, and it allowed finding the three
errors detailed below:
• In case of a power unit failure, the violation of Prop-
erty 1 led us to discover a major error in the model
concerning the connections between the power units
and the wings. With the initial connections, in case
of power unit failure, a wing could not be deployed,
because both the nominal and the redundant connection
were established between the same power unit and
wing. In order to really be one fault tolerant, each power
unit shall power two wings, and each wing shall be
powered by two units.
• In the case of a thermal knife failure, in a particular
configuration, the state machine of the corresponding
hold-down and release system could deadlock because
two knife OFF signals were received (one from the
nominal, one from the redundant knife) but only one
was handled.
• In the case of a control and monitoring unit failure,
Property 1 is rejected. At the end of the deployment
mode, wings’ status verification does not finish in
the given time and the MVM does not receive the
confirmation to continue its mission. This type of error
is actually incorrect, since, in reality, the CMU is
composed by two independent devices which make it
1-fault tolerant, and it has been removed from the set
of possible induced failures. A similar case was found
for thermal control unit failures, which have also been
eliminated.
These errors are very similar to those found by interactive
simulation, but the particular configurations in which they
occur makes them very hard to detect without an automatic
search of the state space.
E. Verification using abstractions
After the errors described above were corrected, the
state space search with concurrency reduced to two threads
produced no further errors. However, since the reduction
eliminates potentially problematic executions, this is not
sufficient to establish the satisfaction of the required property
in the general case. To proceed with verification, we set out
to use abstractions.
Figure 3 shows the communication graph of the SGS
system, generated automatically from the state space ex-
plored as discussed before. Nodes represent block instances
and arrows represent the existence of at least one signal
communication between the block instances at the ends. In
order to make it readable, we structure the graph accordingly
to the three categories of the system - mission management,
software and hardware - and we group the instances of each
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Figure 3. System’s communication graph displaying the block instances - represented as nodes - and communications between them - represented as
arrows
wing as they represent the key concept of our abstraction.
As one can see, each of the 4 wings generate a large
structure of block instances, corresponding to the hardware
equipment of the wing. However, from the point of view of
the software blocks (which are the only other blocks with
which it communicates), a wing that does not experience any
hardware fault exhibits a very simple behaviour: it ends up
by being deployed. Therefore, one can set out to verify the
property of deployment under 1-fault hypothesis (Property 1)
by replacing all the 3 wings in which no fault occurs by
an abstract version that models this simple behaviour. This
requires to run a separate verification for each one of the
62 faults, using one of four possible versions of the SGS
model (one version for every combination of 3 wings that
are replaced by an abstract model).
Due to the interconnection of wings and solar array
driving groups - members of thermal control units (TCUs), it
is actually possible to further group an abstract wing and its
corresponding TCU, if the concrete wing is not connected to
the same TCU. The corresponding abstraction is represented
by a TCU WING block. Thus, after abstraction, each of the
4 versions of the model contains one concrete wing and its
TCU, one abstract wing connected to the same TCU, an
ABSTRACT TCU block connected to both concrete wing
and abstract wing, and two abstract TCU WING blocks.
The communication graph of an abstract model is shown in
Figure 4. The system is reduced, in average, by 55% with
respect to the number of block instances, port instances and
connectors.
The behaviour of an abstract wing consumes all received
signals and answers not deployed for the first 400 seconds
since system start-up (the minimal delay needed for a correct
deployment) and as deployed after 350 seconds since start-
up (the answer between 350 and 400 seconds is non-
deterministic). The difference of 50 seconds is related to the
end steps of the deployment procedures, in which the wing
can be deployed or not. The abstracted TCU WING has a
similar behaviour, with the difference that needs at least 280
seconds for deployment and can be not deployed for at most
330 seconds. These intervals were manually computed by
adding the time needed for each step and trying to minimize
their intersection were the wing has a non deterministic
behaviour with respect to its status.
The reduced model was model-checked by injecting fail-
ures one at a time. Concerning thermal knives, due to the
parallelization, we found an error scenario. Deployment
starts by switching on a subset of nominal knives for each
wing. The knife will inform the hold-down and release
system of its enabling. If, in these 50 seconds needed for
the cut, the redundant knife (which is off) fails, it will send
the disabling command to the hold-down system, and the
HDRS won’t be cut. Now, the redundant knife cannot be
enabled (due to the failure mode), the cable is not cut and
the wing not deployed. The correction is to send the switch
off request in case of failure only if the knife is on.
For all the other injected failures, the property is satisfied.
Table I presents the average time needed for the verification
(in seconds) of each class of errors. In the case of the later
one, the verification of the induced failure on the power unit
responsible for the nominal connection with the concrete
wing does not finish, while with the induced failure on
the power unit responsible for the redundant connection the
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Figure 4. Abstract system’s communication graph - the instances for three
of the four wings are replaced with simpler components
Table I
AVERAGE TIME VERIFICATION FOR INDUCED FAILURES
Induced Failure Average Verification Time (s)
Thermal Knife 13993
Hold-down and release system 12272
Solar array driving group 11377
Power unit ∞
requirement is verified in 11394 seconds. This shows the
asymmetry of the system model.
F. Towards contract-based reasoning
In order for the verification described in the previous
section to be complete, we still need to prove that the
abstractions of wings and TCUs that we used are correct.
However, this is not possible without making certain as-
sumptions about the environment in which a wing operates,
which is composed of the mission management, the software
parts, the control and monitoring units and the power units.
The assumptions concern the order and the timing in which
messages are sent by the environment; in their absence,
the concrete model of a wing can deadlock or malfunction,
which is not captured by the abstraction.
One then has to verify that the environment actually
guarantees these assumptions, which is true only under the
assumption that the wings and TCUs operate correctly as
specified in the abstraction. This kind of circular argument
is used and can be proved to be sound in certain contract-
based verification frameworks [30], [29].
Defining such a contract framework for OMEGA SysML
and supporting it in the toolset is part of our future work
roadmap. In initial experiments, we have manually repre-
sented guarantees as observers and verified each guarantee
for the concerned component by manually extracting the
relevant model part. When a guarantee needed to be used
as assumption for another component, we represented it as
a normal SysML block exhibiting all behaviours allowed
by the guarantee, again by manually constructing the corre-
sponding state machine. All these steps have been formally
verified within our toolbox, thus proving the abstraction
correct.
VII. RELATED WORK
In the recent years, several tools have been developed
to support model-checking for high-level languages such
as UML, SysML or AADL [33]. Based on well known
model checkers, they are either directly integrated into tool
modellers or they provide transformation techniques from
the input model (usually expressed in an XMI file) to the
target language of the model checker used. For example,
the toolkit SysML Companion [31] provides as extensions
model-checking in UPPAAL [39] and Spin [36].
IBM Rhapsody includes validation by simulation in its
toolbox. [10] proposes to use UPPAAL in order to verify
Rhapsody state machines, the transformation being based on
state name equivalence with intermediary states generated
for composed actions. System’s properties, even though ini-
tially described by requirements diagram, have to be given as
Computational Tree Logic (CTL) formulas for the UPPAAL
model to be checked. However, the lack of an automatized
toolset for these transformations makes the approach error
prone - the model described in the two frameworks might
not be equivalent, which makes harder to identify if the
errors found by model-checking are spurious, introduced at
the translation, or true system errors.
ARTiSAN Real-time Studio [2] is connected to NuSMV
[15] model-checker in [1] which translates a large subset of
UML/SysML diagrams (e.g., sequence, activity and timing
diagrams, state machine diagrams, block definition and
internal block diagrams) to the intermediary Configuration
Transition Systems (CTS) formal model. The framework
proposes to verify system designs both by model-checking
and by metrics and program analysis. Structure diagrams
are usually subject to metrics analysis, while behavioural
diagrams are translated into the intermediate formal model
and model-checked with respect to automatically generated
properties and manually specified ones as CTL formulas. For
example, hierarchical state machines are transformed into
CTS where each state represents either its correspondent
one in case of top states or a set of states in case of a
composite state in the original diagram. For each state of the
CTS, reachability and deadlock formulas are automatically
generated as CTL formulas and verified on the model.
However, the temporal extensions for state machines are
not presented and neither their impact on the operational
semantics. Moreover, state machines are model-checked
separately. Our case study is based on the composition of
several individual behaviours, composition that is not taken
into consideration within this approach which makes it less
suitable to be explored. Furthermore, expressing properties
as CTL formulas might be a difficult step since system and
software engineers are not experts in formal methods and
temporal logic.
The Topcased Environment [38] provides connections
with UPPAAL and CADP toolkit [11] for SysML models.
The AGATE project [32] uses SysML Activity Diagrams, a
different formalism than ours, extended with MARTE Profile
[22] stereotypes to model the timed behaviour of a system
model and translates them into UPPAAL timed automata
in order to analyse the execution of the system on a mono
platform processor. A second approach within TOPCASED
is the usage the pivot language FIACRE [4] to connect
AADL and SysML models to CADP. In this case, the latter
transformation is not implemented to our knowledge and
could not be evaluated.
The academic TTool [37] transforms SysML models that
comply with the AVATAR Profile [26] into UPPAAL and
CADP for model checking, minimization and bisimulation
verification. It takes into account SysML Block Diagrams
and state machines extended with temporal operators to
express timing constraints (e.g., the delay for which the
activity of a block is suspended and computation time
for instructions). The communication between blocks is
realized via synchronous and asynchronous channels mod-
elled as connectors (between ports). Safety requirement are
expressed using TEPE property language [14], while secu-
rity properties are expressed and checked within ProVerif
[27]. Because TTool is compatible only with the profiles
it supports and our project can’t be imported, experiments
were carried out on toy models. The main difference between
the two approaches relates to the sound typing system that
OMEGA-IFx provides with respect to ports and connectors.
In AVATAR, ports are typeless (contracts cannot be spec-
ified for ports), while connectors statically specify which
signals they forward and in which direction. This leads to
models of bidirectional ports which are a source of typing
inconsistencies when translating a SysML model into an
implementation language, as explained in [17]. Moreover,
a signal can be sent through only one channel and the
same channel can transfer requests in both way. This greatly
increases the complexity of the verification model, since in
our case study the same request is transferred through several
connectors; for example, when the four wings communicate
their deployment status to the control and monitoring unit,
they use the same output port of their owner connected in
cascade with the target. Also, the broadcast communication
type is not considered in this framework, while OMEGA-
IFx implements this option used in industrial system mod-
els often implemented in synchronous languages [3]. With
respect to the properties model, TEPE uses the parametric
diagrams of SysML to express logical and temporal relations
between block attributes and signals. The system described
by blocks and state machine diagrams is translated into
timed automata; parametric diagrams are transformed into
observer automata for the UPPAAL model and checked
for reachability and liveness. It uses the same principle as
our toolbox, with the difference that we express properties
as state machines which can be more handy for system
engineers than learning a new specification language. One
can see than even if AVATAR-TEPE-TTool is an interesting
approach, our framework is more industrially-oriented and
fits the process of developing safe code for embedded critical
systems, also due to the Full MDE Process.
VIII. CONCLUSIONS
The difficulties often met during the development of
complex critical systems are well-known: late discovery of
errors in the system architecture, incompatible interfaces
of interacting components, ambiguities in the descriptions
leading to misinterpretations by the development teams. The
Model Driven Engineering process proposed by the Full
MDE project aims at decreasing the number of misunder-
standings during the development process, reducing the cost
of verification and validation and improving the quality of
the final system.
In this paper we have presented the validation of a reverse
engineering model of the Solar Generation System of the
ATV by using the IFx-OMEGA approach. We have worked
on a subsystem developed with OMEGA SysML Profile for
which we expressed requirements by observers that were
then verified by simulation and model-checking using the
IFx toolset. Due to the complexity of the system model the
verifications were performed on an abstraction of the model.
This framework has allowed discovering residual errors in
the system model at early stages of the development process.
The case study has also allowed to point out the weak
points of current tools and the path to future improvements.
In particular, all proofs were realized on abstraction that have
been manually designed. For industrial models, this might
be a difficult and time-consuming task. In order to cope with
the complexity of nowadays systems, we propose to develop
within our framework automated abstractions generation
and proofs by integrating a contract-based approach. [30]
has proposed a framework for compositional verification of
systems with assume/guarantee contracts for different input
formalism, like labelled transition systems, modal transition
systems [29] or input/output automata [28]. We are currently
working on adopting this methodology and extending it for
OMEGA SysML components, which are a version of timed
input/output automata.
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